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INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE1 
Stephen E. Sachs is an assistant professor at 
Duke University School of Law. He teaches and 
writes about civil procedure and conflict of laws, and 
he has an interest in the sound development of these 
fields. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The parties in this case defend two sides of a 
many-sided circuit split. This brief argues that a 
third view is correct. 
If a contract requires suit in a particular forum, 
and the plaintiff sues somewhere else, how may the 
defendant raise the issue? Petitioner Atlantic Marine 
Construction Company suggests a motion under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) or 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1406,2 on the theory that the contract renders ven-
ue improper. Pet. Br. 3. Respondent J-Crew Man-
                                            
1 All parties have consented in writing to the filing of this brief. 
No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, 
and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended 
to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. Duke Uni-
versity School of Law provides financial support for activities 
related to faculty members’ research and scholarship, which 
helped defray the costs of preparing this brief. (The School is 
not a signatory to the brief, and the views expressed here are 
those of the amicus curiae.) Otherwise, no person or entity other 
than the amicus curiae or his counsel has made a monetary con-
tribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this 
brief. 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all “Rule” references are to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and all statutory references 
are to Title 28, U.S. Code. 
2 
 
agement, Inc. contends that venue remains proper, 
and that the defendant’s only remedy is a transfer 
motion under § 1404. Br. in Opp. (BIO) 11. 
Both sides are wrong. Forum-selection clauses 
have no effect on venue, which is defined by statute. 
While parties can waive their venue objections in ad-
vance, they cannot destroy proper venue by private 
agreement. 
At the same time, an exclusive forum-selection 
clause does more than just inform a court’s discretion 
under § 1404. If the clause is valid and enforceable, it 
waives the plaintiff’s right to sue in an excluded fo-
rum, offering the defendant an affirmative defense to 
liability in that forum and the right to have the suit 
dismissed. 
The Federal Rules already specify the correct 
method of raising this defense: it must be affirma-
tively stated in the answer, which the defendant may 
accompany with an immediate summary judgment 
motion. See Rules 8(c)(1), 12(b), (a)–(b). Often, as 
here, the parties’ agreement will be incorporated in 
the complaint. In that case, the defendant may alter-
natively raise the defense in a pre-answer Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, or a post-answer Rule 
12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
The Rules’ default procedures are practical as 
well as correct. They enable defendants to obtain 
quick and decisive enforcement of their forum-
selection clauses, through the same procedures used 
to enforce binding prior judgments, settlements, or 
arbitral awards. And while there may be some prac-
tical advantages to treating forum-selection clauses 
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as if they affected venue, these advantages have been 
greatly exaggerated—and, in any case, provide no 
reason to misapply the Federal Rules. 
Here, the parties agreed that their disputes 
“shall be litigated” in state or federal court in 
Norfolk, Va. J.A. 28. J-Crew violated that agreement 
by suing in the Western District of Texas. Assuming, 
as the Court should, that the clause at issue is valid 
and enforceable, the complaint could have been dis-
missed by motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Instead, At-
lantic Marine made this forum-selection defense un-
der the label of Rule 12(b)(3). That may have been 
good enough to raise the issue, but the Court should 
leave such preservation questions to the court of ap-
peals in the first instance. Because that court (and 
the district court) proceeded on the erroneous as-
sumption that § 1404 was the only available remedy, 
this Court should identify the correct procedure, va-
cate the judgment, and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Forum-Selection Clauses Cannot Render 
Improper a Statutorily Proper Venue. 
A.  Proper venue is defined by statute. 
In ordinary speech, “venue” often serves as a 
general term for “place” (as in a “wedding venue”). As 
forum-selection clauses concern the proper place of 
litigation, it may be natural to think—as Atlantic 
Marine argues, and as a number of the courts of 
appeals have ruled—that such clauses also determine 
the proper venue. 
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But that is a mistake. The term “venue,” as it 
appears in the Federal Rules and in Title 28, is a 
term of art, defined to “refer[] to the geographic speci- 
fication” by Congress of particular courts “for the 
litigation of a civil action.” § 1390(a). In each case, 
venue is “statutorily specified,” Leroy v. Great W. 
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183 (1979), as proper or 
improper in a given judicial district regardless of 
what the parties have agreed. 
That conclusion flows directly from the statutory 
text. Section 1391, the general venue statute, 
provides that “[a] civil action may be brought in” var-
ious judicial districts. § 1391(b) (emphasis added). 
Just as the Federal Rules “regularly use ‘may’ to 
confer categorical permission,” so do various “federal 
statutes that establish procedural entitlements” for 
one party or another. Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 
(2010). Section 1391’s use of “may” falls in the same 
category. Like other Rules and statutes, it “creates a 
categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets 
the specified criteria to pursue his claim,” ibid.—at 
least insofar as venue is concerned. 
A judicial district that Congress has identified as 
a “proper venue for a civil action,” § 1391(a)(2), there-
fore does not become an “improper venue,” Rule 
12(b)(3), or a “wrong” venue, § 1406(a), simply 
because the parties privately agreed to sue 
somewhere else. Rather, the procedural entitlements 
conferred by the general venue statute “govern the 
venue of all civil actions brought in district courts of 
the United States,” “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 
law.” § 1391(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
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Rejecting this reasoning, Atlantic Marine treats 
any suit filed in the incorrect place as having wrong 
or improper venue—emphasizing the plain meanings 
of “wrong” and “improper.” Pet. Br. 15 & n.5. The 
plain meanings of those adjectives are beside the 
point, because what matters is the technical meaning 
of “venue.” Indeed, reading forum-selection clauses to 
destroy statutory venue would make a hash of a 
detailed legislative scheme. For example: 
• Forum-selection clauses are particularly helpful 
in international agreements, when at least one of 
the parties resides abroad. Cf. The Bremen v. 
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) 
(describing forum selection as “an indispensable 
element in international trade, commerce, and 
contracting”). But Congress has specified that, 
“for all venue purposes,” § 1391(c), a defendant 
residing outside the United States “may be sued 
in any judicial district” and should be “disre-
garded in determining where the action may be 
brought with respect to other defendants,” 
§ 1391(c)(3). If forum-selection clauses change 
where venue lies, then either § 1391(c) does not 
really control “for all venue purposes” like it 
says, or else such clauses are inoperative just 
when they might be most needed. 
• The agreement here permits a federal forum, see 
J.A. 28, but the parties could just as easily have 
specified a state or foreign court instead. In that 
case, under Atlantic Marine’s view, venue would 
be improper in every federal judicial district. Pet. 
Br. 18–19. But Congress enacted a fallback ven-
ue statute to guarantee that, “[e]xcept as other-
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wise provided by law,” § 1391(a), and in any case 
within the federal courts’ personal jurisdiction, 
venue will always lie in some judicial district 
should there be “no district in which an action 
may otherwise be brought as provided in this 
section.” § 1391(b)(3); cf. Brunette Machine 
Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 710 
n.8 (1972) (“Congress does not in general intend 
to create venue gaps, which take away with one 
hand what Congress has given by way of juris-
dictional grant with the other.”). 
• When a case is removed from state to federal 
court, the general venue statute does not apply. 
See § 1390(c). Instead, the case can typically be 
removed only to a particular court, “the district 
court of the United States for the district and di-
vision embracing the place where such action is 
pending.” § 1441(a). Suppose, for example, that 
J-Crew had sued in state court in Bell County, 
Texas, and that Atlantic Marine had removed to 
the Western District to enforce its forum-
selection agreement there. Because the clause se-
lects a different district, venue would allegedly 
be improper in the removal court—even though 
§ 1441(a) renders venue automatically proper in 
the forum designated by statute. Polizzi v. 
Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 665–66 
(1953); see also 17 Moore’s Federal Practice 
§ 111.36[5][a], at 179 (3d ed. 2013) (Moore). 
These results are difficult to square with the 
framework created by Congress. 
By contrast, applying that framework straight-
forwardly makes the venue analysis here easy. The 
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parties’ contract called for a construction project in 
the Western District of Texas. See Pet. App. 4a n.10. 
That project was a “substantial part of the events 
* * * giving rise to the claim,” § 1391(b)(2), so the 
case “may be brought” in the Western District, 
§ 1391(b), at least as far as venue is concerned. See 
Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 
529 U.S. 193, 198 (2000) (noting, in a suit alleging 
breach of contract, that venue under the substantial-
part standard is “clearly proper” in a district “within 
which the contract was performed”). 
B. A venue that is proper under § 1391 is 
not “wrong” under § 1406. 
Atlantic Marine does not claim that the venue 
statutes actually contain some invisible-ink exception 
for forum-selection clauses. Instead, it tries to shoe-
horn forum selection into § 1406, which permits dis-
missal or transfer by a district court “in which is filed 
a case laying venue in the wrong division or district.” 
§ 1406(a). Atlantic Marine contends that “wrong” re-
fers to any defect in the forum (e.g., lack of personal 
jurisdiction), not just whether the suit was filed “con-
trary to the venue statutes.” Pet. Br. 9, 15. 
This claim implicates a wholly different circuit 
split,3 and in any case it is incorrect. Applying § 1406 
                                            
3 Compare, e.g., In re Carefirst of Md., Inc., 305 F.3d 253, 255–
56 (CA4 2002) (accepting this “broad construction” of § 1406(a), 
though the statute’s “language suggests otherwise”), with Vier-
now v. Euripides Dev. Corp., 157 F.3d 785, 793 (CA10 1998) (re-
jecting this reading as “strained”); see also 17 Moore 
§ 111.02[1][b][ii][B], at 23. Note that none of the cases cited at 
Pet. Br. 15–16 discuss § 1406 in this context. 
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to every defect in the forum would read “laying ven-
ue” out of the statute—as if the text simply referred 
to any case “filed * * * in the wrong division or dis-
trict.”4 Instead, this Court has always described 
§ 1406 as specifically addressing venue. The section 
“authorize[s] the transfer of cases, however wrong 
the plaintiff may have been in filing his case as to 
venue, whether the court in which it was filed had 
personal jurisdiction over the defendants or not.” 
Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962) 
(emphasis added); see also ibid. (§ 1406 designed to 
prevent injustice resulting from an “erroneous guess” 
as to facts “upon which venue provisions often turn” 
(emphasis added)); accord Henderson v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 654, 667 (1996); Johnson v. Ry. Exp. 
Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 466 n.12 (1975); Reviser’s 
Note to § 1406, 28 U.S.C. at 803 (Supp. 2. 1949) 
(§ 1406(a) permits transfer “where venue is improp-
erly laid”). 
Atlantic Marine’s attempt to “blur” venue with 
other concepts under § 1406 is not just “unfortunate,” 
14D C. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Jurisdiction § 3827, at 579–80 (3d ed. 2007) (Wright); 
it would also render other statutes mere surplusage. 
If a case “lay[s] venue in the wrong * * * district” 
whenever jurisdiction is absent, then Congress would 
not have needed a separate statute to permit trans-
fers for “want of jurisdiction,” see § 1631, or to avoid 
“‘jurisdictional’ dismissals” under the Suits in Admi-
                                            
4 Venue was restricted by division, as well as by district, when 
Congress enacted § 1406. See § 1393 (Supp. 2 1949) (repealed 
1988). 
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ralty Act, see Henderson, 517 U.S. at 667 (citing 46 
U.S.C. App. § 742 (1994), codified as amended at 46 
U.S.C. § 30906(b)). Likewise, if “wrong” and “improp-
er” mean largely the same thing, see Pet. Br. 15 & 
n.5, and if any defective forum is a “wrong ‘venue,’” 
ibid., then Rule 12(b)(3) would render 12(b)(1) and (2) 
unnecessary—“lack of subject-matter jurisdiction” 
and “lack of personal jurisdiction” would both just be 
species of “improper venue.” 
Section 1406—like the rest of Title 28, Chapter 
87—is about venue, not jurisdiction or other defects. 
And a case brought where § 1391(b) says it “may be 
brought” does not “lay[] venue in the wrong division 
or district.” § 1406(a). 
C. Parties cannot render a proper venue 
improper by contract. 
Alternatively, Atlantic Marine portrays forum-
selection clauses as displacing standard venue 
analysis through the parties’ consent. Pet. Br. 12. 
That is not how venue works. 
As this Court has explained, “personal 
jurisdiction [and] venue * * * are personal privileges 
of the defendant” against suit. Leroy, 443 U.S. at 180. 
These privileges, of course, “may be waived by the 
parties.” Ibid.; cf. Pet. Br. 11–12. But neither privi-
lege may be expanded by the parties, because the 
scope of each privilege is determined by law. In other 
words, a party may consent to venue or jurisdiction 
as a potential defendant, giving up its right to assert 
certain legally defined privileges later. But that party 
cannot, as a potential plaintiff, “give up” the fact that 
venue lies in a given district—any more than it can 
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“give up,” in advance, the district court’s personal ju-
risdiction over a defendant. See The Bremen, 407 
U.S. at 12 (“No one seriously contends * * * that the 
forum-selection clause ‘ousted’ the District Court of 
jurisdiction * * * .”); cf. Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws § 80, cmt. a (rev. ed. 1988) (“Private in-
dividuals have no power to alter the rules of judicial 
jurisdiction.”). 
A party may also waive individual arguments 
about venue. One judge of the court of appeals 
described the parties as agreeing “that neither will 
seek to maintain venue” in certain fora. Pet. App. 17a 
(Haynes, J., concurring in the judgment). But even if 
venue were J-Crew’s burden to “maintain” (it may 
not be),5 nothing in the parties’ agreement estops J-
Crew from “maintain[ing]” venue wherever venue 
lies. The agreement promises that a dispute “shall be 
litigated in” Norfolk and consents to jurisdiction and 
venue there. J.A. 28. It makes no representations 
about venue in other districts, any more than about 
personal or subject-matter jurisdiction; and if it had, 
reliance would have been unreasonable in light of 
§ 1391. Even a contract choosing a particular forum 
and reciting that venue is improper in every other 
district would not necessarily make it so. A court is 
                                            
5 There is another circuit split on which party bears the burden 
of establishing proper or improper venue. Compare, e.g., Gulf 
Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner, 417 F.3d 353, 355 (CA2 2005) (plaintiff’s 
burden), with In re Peachtree Lane Assocs., 150 F.3d 788, 792 
(CA7 1998) (defendant’s burden); Myers v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 
695 F.2d 716, 724–25 (CA3 1982) (same); see also 2 Moore’s 
Federal Practice § 12.32[4], at 66; 17 id. § 110.01[5][c], at 22. 
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“not bound to accept, as controlling, [the parties’] 
stipulations as to questions of law,” Sanford’s Estate 
v. CIR, 308 U.S. 39, 51 (1939)—especially when the 
correct answers to those questions are obvious from 
the face of the complaint. 
Perhaps J-Crew is equitably estopped from suing 
in other courts more generally. See Staring, Forgot-
ten Equity: The Enforcement of Forum Clauses, 30 J. 
Mar. L. & Com. 405 (1999); see also Dickerson v. Col-
grove, 100 U.S. 578, 580 (1879) (“[H]e who by his lan-
guage or conduct leads another to do what he would 
not otherwise have done, shall not subject such per-
son to loss or injury by disappointing the expecta-
tions upon which he acted.”). But that simply proves 
the point—for estoppel, in that sense, is not a defect 
in venue, but rather an affirmative defense. See Rule 
8(c)(1) (“estoppel”). 
Again, Atlantic Marine’s argument as to venue 
would work just as well (or poorly) for jurisdiction. 
This Court has said that the party asserting 
jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. See 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 & 
n.3 (2006) (subject-matter jurisdiction); Ins. Corp. of 
Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 
456 U.S. 694, 709 (1982) (personal jurisdiction). A 
prior agreement not to “maintain” jurisdiction, no 
matter how obvious the law, does not cause 
jurisdiction to be absent through a failure of proof. 
Otherwise, the parties could “oust” the courts’ 
jurisdiction in precisely the way that The Bremen 
rejected. Given that parties cannot strip courts of 
jurisdiction by contract, they cannot strip judicial 
districts of statutorily specified venue either. 
12 
 
Forum-selection clauses therefore have no more 
to do with “venue”—other than in the loose sense of 
“place”—than they do with personal or subject-
matter jurisdiction. Objections based on such clauses 
fit no better under Rule 12(b)(3) or § 1406 than they 
do under Rule 12(b)(1) or (2)—that is, not at all. 
II. An Enforceable Forum-Selection Clause 
May Be Raised as an Affirmative Defense. 
According to J-Crew, if a forum-selection clause 
does not destroy proper venue, then the only remedy 
left for the plaintiff’s breach of the clause is a 
transfer motion under § 1404. BIO 11.6 
That does not follow. Forum-selection clauses are 
not an unprovided-for case under the Federal Rules. 
Rather, the Rules already specify the correct 
enforcement procedure: a forum-selection clause 
must be raised as an affirmative defense. 
A. The Rules already provide a method for 
raising forum-selection defenses. 
An exclusive forum-selection clause is exactly 
what it sounds like: a contractual agreement that 
consents to litigation in a particular forum and relin-
quishes the parties’ right to select any other forum. 
The exclusive nature of the clause makes it a form of 
waiver, “the ‘intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right.’” Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. 
Ct. 1826, 1835 (2012) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 
U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004)). If the clause is valid and 
                                            
6 Or, perhaps, a separate suit for damages. See Pet. App. 25a 
n.5 (Haynes, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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enforceable, it serves as a defense to the plaintiff’s 
claim. Specifically, it is an affirmative defense—a 
reason to deny judgment to the plaintiff that remains 
valid “even if all the allegations in the complaint are 
true,” Black’s Law Dictionary 482 (B. Garner ed., 9th 
ed. 2009), or that the defendant “cannot raise by a 
simple denial in the answer,” 5 C. Wright & A. Mil-
ler, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 1271, at 
585 (3d ed. 2004) (Wright & Miller). 
Under the general default established by Rule 8, 
“any avoidance or affirmative defense” must be “af-
firmatively state[d]” in the defendant’s answer. Rule 
8(c)(1) (emphasis added).7 This is the standard meth-
od for raising defenses under the Rules: except for 
seven special defenses that may be raised “by mo-
tion,” “[e]very defense to a claim for relief * * * must 
be asserted in the responsive pleading.” Rule 12(b) 
(emphasis added). Were there any doubt, the Rules 
also provide examples of affirmative defenses, with 
“waiver” specifically included on the list. Rule 8(c)(1). 
That a forum-selection clause offers an affirma-
tive defense does not mean, however, that a defend-
ant must always go to trial to enforce it. When a fo-
rum-selection clause raises “no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact”—say, because its authenticity is 
undisputed, and the only disagreements involve pure 
questions of law—the defendant may immediately 
                                            
7 Cf. Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, at 156, 339 (defining 
“avoidance,” under “confession and avoidance,” as “[a] plea in 
which a defendant admits allegations but pleads additional 
facts that deprive the admitted facts of an adverse legal effect”). 
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file a motion for summary judgment under Rule 
56(a). There is no waiting period for summary judg-
ment motions; the defendant can file one contempo-
raneously with its answer, if it wishes. See Rule 
56(b); cf. Advisory Committee’s Notes, 28 U.S.C. app. 
at 268 (2006).8 
In many cases (including this one), the defendant 
will not even need to answer the complaint, because 
the case can be dismissed by pre-answer motion un-
der Rule 12(b)(6). “A complaint is subject to dismissal 
for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as 
true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief”—such 
as “when an affirmative defense . . . appears on its 
face.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted; omission in original). 
For Rule 12(b)(6) purposes, the complaint’s allega-
tions include material “incorporated into the com-
plaint by reference.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). In most con-
tract cases, the parties’ agreement is “integral to the 
claim,” and it will be attached to the complaint as an 
exhibit “whose authenticity is unquestioned”—
making it “part of [the] complaint by implication.” 5B 
Wright & Miller § 1357, at 376; id. at 186 (Supp. 
2013). That permits enforcement of the clause 
through Rule 12(b)(6), or alternatively through a 
                                            
8 Should that motion be denied, nothing in the Federal Rules 
stops the defendant from filing another summary judgment mo-
tion on the merits later on. Courts often accept successive sum-
mary judgment motions when there is good cause to do so. See 
11 Moore § 56.121[1][b], at 300 & n.5.  
15 
 
Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See 
Rule 12(h)(2)(B); 5C Wright & Miller § 1367, at 207. 
Thus, while the particular motion filed depends 
on the contents of the complaint, the Rules leave lit-
tle doubt about the general approach. A forum-
selection clause should be processed in the same 
manner as any other defense that justifies the denial 
of relief but that is not specifically listed in Rule 
12(b). 
Indeed, this is the same procedure that defend-
ants must use to enforce various other rights not to 
litigate—for example, because they have already set-
tled the plaintiff’s claim, or already resolved the issue 
in arbitration, or even already litigated the claim or 
issue to judgment in a prior case and won. “Release,” 
“arbitration and award,” “res judicata,” and “estop-
pel” are all affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c)(1). 
Unless these defenses are apparent from the com-
plaint or matters for judicial notice, defendants can-
not make them under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) and must 
resort to summary judgment or trial. Yet the default 
procedures of the Federal Rules still protect such de-
fendants from unjustified litigation. 
In the same way, these default procedures pro-
vide parties that have agreed on a particular forum 
with the full measure of certainty and predictability 
described by The Bremen. See 407 U.S. at 13–14. If 
the case is filed in the wrong forum, the defendant 
has a right to have it dismissed, and an adequate 
procedure under the Federal Rules for enforcing that 
right. 
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B. This Court’s decisions are best read as 
treating a forum-selection clause as an 
affirmative defense. 
Treating a forum-selection clause as an 
affirmative defense is consistent not only with the 
text of the Rules but also with this Court’s 
jurisprudence. The Court has repeatedly stated that 
forum-selection clauses can justify dismissal, but it 
has never suggested that they do so by rendering 
venue improper. The Court did enforce a forum-
selection clause in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), in which the original 
motion for summary judgment had asserted a venue 
defect under § 1406, see Shute v. Carnival Cruise 
Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 379, 387 (CA9 1988). But the 
Court’s opinion never mentioned either § 1406 or the 
word “venue,” and it can hardly be read as endorsing 
that theory.9 
By contrast, in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. 
Ricoh Corp., the Court approvingly noted the parties’ 
understanding that a § 1406 motion to dismiss “for 
improper venue” had been “properly denied * * * [,] 
because respondent apparently does business in the 
[district].” 487 U.S. 22, 27 n.8 (1988). Atlantic Marine 
portrays this statement as a mere summary of the 
                                            
9 Likewise, in Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 
the Court enforced a forum-selection clause without specifying 
what motion had been filed in the district court. See 130 S. Ct. 
2433, 2440 (2010). The Court’s only discussion of venue was in 
explaining that the statutory venue provisions of the Carmack 
Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 11706(d), did not apply to that case. 
See 130 S. Ct. at 2441–42. 
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parties’ positions, Pet. Br. 23. But the Court’s words 
in Stewart carry far more weight than its silence 
about the proper motion in Shute. The Stewart Court 
recognized that statutory venue would lie 
irrespective of what the parties had agreed. 
Moreover, rather than suggesting that forum-
selection clauses render venue improper, this Court 
has traditionally described such clauses as conferring 
a contractual right to dismissal. Although the 
petitioner in The Bremen had originally “moved to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,” 407 U.S. at 4, the 
Court rejected any jurisdictional “ouste[r]” theory, 
see id. at 12, and instead framed the issue as one of 
specific performance of the contract: “The correct 
approach would have been to enforce the forum 
clause specifically * * * .” Id. at 15. 
Similarly, in Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser. the 
Court described the defendant as having a “contrac-
tual right to [a particular] forum,” 490 U.S. 495, 499 
(1989), and as seeking to have its “agreement * * * 
enforced by the federal courts,” id. at 501. (The peti-
tioner in Lauro Lines had originally filed a motion to 
dismiss “pursuant to Rules 12(b) and 56.” Appendix 
in No. 88-23, pp. 2–3.) The Court repeated this depic-
tion in Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, 
Inc., where it described the forum-selection clause in 
Lauro Lines as conferring a “contractual right to lim-
it trial to [a particular] forum.” 511 U.S. 863, 874 
(1994). 
The Court has also explained that the 
contractual right conferred by a forum-selection 
clause justifies dismissal rather than transfer to 
another court. In Lauro Lines, the Court noted that a 
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district court’s failure to respect the clause would be 
reversible error, which may be raised on “appeal 
after final judgment” just like “a claim that the trial 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.” 490 U.S. at 501; see also id. at 502–03 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the remedy for an 
erroneously denied motion as “permitting the trial to 
occur and reversing its outcome”). Because this 
contractual right can preclude the defendant’s 
liability without necessarily contradicting the 
plaintiff’s complaint, it must be raised as an 
affirmative defense.10 
                                            
10 Some courts of appeals have adopted a similar approach. In 
Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., the Third 
Circuit described a forum-selection clause as “merely 
constitut[ing] a stipulation,” whereby “the parties join in asking 
the court to give effect to their agreement.” 367 F.2d 341, 345 
(CA3 1966). That case arose on a 12(b)(6) motion, which the 
Third Circuit properly converted to a motion for summary 
judgment under Rule 56. See id. at 343. The First Circuit then 
relied on Central Contracting when it endorsed the use of a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, see LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pac. Sewer Maint. 
Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 6–7 (CA1 1984), and it has maintained that 
rule to this day, see Rivera v. Centro Médico de Turabo, Inc., 
575 F.3d 10, 15–16 (CA1 2009); Silva v. Encyclopedia 
Britannica Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 387–88 (CA1 2001); cf. Langley v. 
Prudential Mortg. Capital Co., 546 F.3d 365 (CA6 2008) (per 
curiam) (permitting 12(b)(6) or § 1404); 14D Wright § 3803.1, at 
112 & n.72 (3d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2013) (“The better view * * * is 
that a forum selection clause does not render venue improper in 
an otherwise proper forum and that a valid clause should be 
enforced by either a Section 1404(a) transfer or a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”) (citing cases). 
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C. The affirmative-defense procedure is 
practical as well as correct. 
On a natural reading of the Rules, forum-
selection clauses must be raised as affirmative de-
fenses. Surprisingly, few courts and commentators 
have mounted serious arguments to the contrary. 
Some have failed to consider the affirmative-defense 
theory, assuming § 1404 to be the only alternative to 
a venue approach. See, e.g., Pet. App. 5a. Others have 
dismissed the theory out of hand based on a misread-
ing of Stewart.11 Most, however, have rejected it for 
reasons unrelated to the text, preferring to use venue 
concepts based on an imagined balance of practical 
costs and benefits—reasons to call the issue venue, 
even if it isn’t. See, e.g., Sucampo Pharms., Inc. v. 
Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 549 (CA4 2006); 
Argueta v. Banco Mexicano, S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 324 
(CA9 1996); see also Pet. App. 24a (Haynes, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (searching for “the 
cleanest way” to enforce the clause); cf. Pet. Br. 17–
18.12 
                                            
11 See, e.g., Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 
1285, 1290 (CA11 1998) (finding “no significant doctrinal error” 
in using Rule 12(b)(6), but preferring 12(b)(3) based on the non 
sequitur that Stewart arose under § 1404, a “transfer-of-venue 
statute”). 
12 See also, e.g., 17 Moore § 111.04[3][b][i]–[ii], [4][c], at 39–43, 
52.3–.6; Davies, Forum Selection Clauses in Maritime Cases, 27 
Tul. Mar. L.J. 367, 369–72, 375 (2003); Staring, supra, at 408; 
Holt, Note, A Uniform System for the Enforceability of Forum 
Selection Clauses in Federal Courts, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1913, 
1924–25 (2009). 
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The Rules do set out a number of procedures for 
handling venue that might be convenient if applied to 
forum-selection clauses. For example, venue 
objections: 
• may be raised before answering the complaint, 
see Rule 12(b)(3); 
• may rely on evidence outside the complaint, see 
Rule 12(d); 
• are waived if raised too late, see Rule 12(h)(1); 
• have contested facts determined by the court, not 
a jury, see Rule 43(c); and 
• result in dismissals that are not “on the merits,” 
Rule 41(b). 
Even on their own practical terms, however, these 
concerns are largely overblown or misguided. And, in 
any case, they offer no reason to ignore the Federal 
Rules. 
Timing. Treating a forum-selection clause as an 
affirmative defense may seem like a catch-22. The 
defendant still has to answer the complaint in the 
plaintiff’s chosen forum, properly stating the defense 
under Rule 8(c)(1), just to assert its right not to liti-
gate there in the first place. 
But this sells the pleading process short. As not-
ed above, the Rules expect just the same of defend-
ants that have already settled the case, completed an 
arbitration, or litigated the case to judgment and 
won. See Rule 8(c)(1) (listing “release,” “arbitration 
and award,” “res judicata,” and “estoppel”). Each of 
these defenses presents just as much need for cer-
tainty and repose as does a forum-selection clause. If 
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a defendant that has already settled the case still has 
to file an answer and a summary judgment motion, 
then that is not too much to expect from a defendant 
that merely claims the contractual right to litigate in 
a different forum. 
In most forum-selection cases, moreover, the 
agreement is incorporated in the complaint, and the 
defendant may move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 
before filing an answer. Sometimes the parties might 
have entered into a wholly separate agreement on 
forum selection, which likely would not be so incorpo-
rated. But even if the defendant has to use summary 
judgment, Rule 56(b) places no limit on how early 
such a motion may be brought. Given that Shute it-
self arose on a motion for summary judgment, see 
499 U.S. at 588, it is hard to portray this procedure 
as inadequate. 
Evidence. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court 
assumes the truth of the complaint’s well-pleaded 
allegations, and will not accept other evidence 
without converting the motion to one for summary 
judgment under Rule 56. Two courts of appeals have 
relied on these grounds to find Rule 12(b)(6) 
inappropriate for forum selection—reasoning that, in 
order to attack the clause under The Bremen’s 
standards (e.g., for fraud), the plaintiff will usually 
need to cite evidence outside the complaint. See 
Argueta, 87 F.2d at 324; accord Sucampo, 471 F.3d at 
549; Pet. Br. 18. 
This objection proves too much. A plaintiff might 
need extra-complaint evidence whenever an 
affirmative defense is asserted under Rule 12(b)(6). 
Consider a statute of limitations defense: the 
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defendant might have agreed to waive that defense 
in an earlier proceeding, see, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. 
v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 242 (1981), and evidence of 
that waiver would almost always be outside the 
complaint. Any need for outside evidence is easily 
handled under Rule 12(d), which provides the parties 
with a “reasonable opportunity” to develop and 
present the facts.13 
Indeed, conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
summary judgment under Rules 12(d) and 56 is 
hardly a catastrophe. If there were a true factual 
dispute over the validity of the clause—say, whether 
it had been inserted by fraud, or whether the 
plaintiff’s signature on the agreement was forged—
then facts will need to be gathered, whether through 
“jurisdictional discovery” or actual discovery. Calling 
the forum-selection question “venue” does not make 
the factual problem go away. Federal courts can and 
should structure discovery to answer the forum-
selection question first, before digging into the merits 
as a whole. See Rules 16(b), 26(b)(2)(C). 
Waiver. A venue defect must be raised in the 
answer or pre-answer motion or else it is waived. 
                                            
13 Alternatively, if the complaint happens to anticipate an alter-
native defense (say, by alleging that the forum-selection clause 
was inserted by fraud), and those allegations are not struck as 
surplusage, see 5 Wright & Miller § 1276, at 623–24, then tak-
ing the allegations as true is obviously the right thing to do on a 
12(b)(6) motion. The pleaded fact is plainly in dispute, and it is 
reasonable for the court to expect affidavits or admissible evi-
dence on the subject before enforcing the clause. See Rule 
56(c)(2), (4). 
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Rule 12(h)(1). By contrast, failure to state a claim—
once pleaded in the answer—may be raised by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or even “at trial.” Rule 
12(b), (h)(2)(B)–(C). That might seem inappropriate 
for forum selection: if a case truly belongs somewhere 
else, the defendant should not wait for a full-blown 
trial before pressing the issue. See Pet. Br. 17–18. 
That objection misconceives the waiver rule. De-
fendants waive venue under Rule 12(h)(1)(A) only by 
filing Rule 12(b) motions on other grounds. Nothing 
stops them from pleading improper venue in the an-
swer and then waiting to press it at trial. See Rule 
12(h)(1)(B)(ii). Mislabeling forum selection as venue, 
then, hardly guarantees a quick resolution. 
More importantly, whatever the procedural vehi-
cle used, a defendant’s right to raise a waiver defense 
(including a forum-selection clause) is itself limited 
by ordinary waiver doctrines. An affirmative defense 
is waived if not pleaded in the answer. See Rule 
8(c)(1); 2 Moore § 8.08[3], at 62. And a defendant can 
waive defenses by its conduct, as well as by formal 
omission. See Democratic Republic of Congo v. FG 
Hemisphere Assocs., 508 F.3d 1062, 1064–65 (CADC 
2007) (citing cases). For example, when parties have 
agreed to arbitration but the plaintiff sues anyway, 9 
U.S.C. § 3 imposes no time limit on the defendant’s 
motion to compel arbitration. But a defendant that 
waits too long to file, acting inconsistently with its 
arbitration right by continuing to litigate in the 
plaintiff’s chosen forum, may be found to have waived 
that right. 13D Wright § 3569, at 526–28 & nn.83–84 
(3d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2013); see also Moses H. Cone 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 
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(1983) (describing “waiver” and “delay” as “defense[s] 
to arbitrability”). The same is true of a late-filed fo-
rum non conveniens motion. 14D Wright § 3828, at 
627 & n.17. 
So here. A defendant that waits too long to de-
mand its chosen forum, preferring to litigate in the 
forum the plaintiff picked, will waive its right to liti-
gate elsewhere. See, e.g., Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 
F.3d 825, 830–31 (CA7 1995). Courts have long en-
forced this standard as a matter of equity in the con-
texts of arbitration or forum non conveniens, even 
without the hard-and-fast limits of Rule 12(h)(1). Be-
cause equitable waiver doctrines continue to apply, it 
is hard to imagine circumstances in which a defend-
ant could successfully “lie behind the log” and delay 
the enforcement of a forum-selection clause. 
Jury trial. When venue is raised by motion, any 
facts relevant to the defense are determined by the 
court, usually on affidavits. See Rule 43(c); 14D 
Wright § 3826, at 555 & n.20. By contrast, if an 
affirmative defense presents a genuine dispute of 
material fact, it cannot be resolved by motion under 
Rules 12 or 56. If the case is jury-eligible and a party 
so demands, the issue has to go to the jury. See Rules 
38, 39(a). Why should the parties have to endure a 
jury trial, just to find out where they should start the 
litigation? 
This procedure may seem strange. See Pet. Br. 
17–18. But every reason supporting jury trials in 
general also supports such a right here. If the 
validity and enforceability of a forum-selection clause 
rests on genuinely disputed facts—say, whether the 
plaintiff ever signed the agreement in the first 
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place—then the plaintiff may have a right to have 
those facts determined by a jury, not a judge. (Under 
the Federal Arbitration Act, by comparison, “[i]f the 
making of the arbitration agreement * * * be in is-
sue,” then the matter may have to be resolved by jury 
trial, 9 U.S.C. § 4—even though a crucial goal of arbi-
tration is to obtain speedy process outside the 
courts.) 
Most of the time, of course, there will not be any 
relevant facts in dispute (as here), or the dispute over 
those facts will not be genuine. In such cases, the 
clause’s validity can be resolved quickly by the court 
on motion rather than by a jury. And even when 
there are genuine disputes, the parties would not 
have to wait for a trial of the whole cause, as a dis-
trict court can and should order a separate trial un-
der Rule 42(b). 
Merits. The most fundamental objection to treat-
ing forum-selection clauses as affirmative defenses is 
that defenses ought to concern the merits, while fo-
rum selection concerns only the place of suit. Pet. Br. 
18. And theoretical scruples aside, there are practical 
differences as well. A dismissal based on an 
affirmative defense, unlike one for venue, typically 
“operates as an adjudication on the merits.” Rule 
41(b). But not every plaintiff, having been kicked out 
for going to the wrong court, should be forever 
foreclosed from going to the right court. 
In fact, this dismissal issue is a red herring. A 
court can always issue a dismissal without prejudice 
if it chooses. See ibid. (“Unless the dismissal order 
states otherwise, * * * .”). Moreover, for purposes of 
the Civil Rules, an “adjudication on the merits” un-
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der Rule 41 means only that the plaintiff cannot “re-
turn[] later, to the same court, with the same under-
lying claim.” Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001) (emphasis added). 
Whether that is “sufficient” to bar the claim in other 
courts does not depend on Rule 41, but on the ordi-
narily applicable doctrines of preclusion—which 
might differ based on the forum State or the circum-
stances of the case, “by direction of this Court.” Id. at 
506–07.14 
More generally, there is nothing strange about 
viewing forum selection as a defense to liability in a 
particular court. One may have a substantive right—
even a nonwaivable right—“to impose liability” on 
another, without having a similar right to “suit in all 
competent courts.” CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 
132 S. Ct. 665, 671 (2012) (emphasis omitted). Like 
venue or personal jurisdiction, forum selection is a 
                                            
14 For example, “[a]t common law dismissal on a ground not go-
ing to the merits was not ordinarily a bar to a subsequent action 
on the same claim.” Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 285 
(1961) (addressing dismissals based on preconditions to suit). A 
forum-selection dismissal, like a dismissal for forum non con-
veniens, arguably “‘den[ies] audience to a case on the merits,’” 
deciding only “that the merits should be adjudicated elsewhere.” 
Sinochem Int’l v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping, 549 U.S. 422, 432 
(2007) (alteration in original; quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon 
Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999)). On the other hand, if a de-
fendant has already “been put to the trouble of preparing his 
defense,” then barring future actions by the plaintiff may be 
appropriate. See Costello, 265 U.S. at 287; accord Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments § 20, cmt. n (1982) (noting that “estoppel 
or laches” may bar a second suit when “it would be plainly un-
fair to subject the defendant to a second action”). 
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good defense in some districts but not others. But 
unlike those defenses, it is has not been given a 
special status under Rule 12(b). 
* * * 
Even if it were more convenient to treat forum 
selection the way we treat personal jurisdiction or 
venue, the only lawful method of doing so is to amend 
the Federal Rules. The Court, acting under § 2072, 
could always add a new Rule 12(b)(8) defense—
“violation of a forum-selection clause”—which could 
be raised by pre-answer motion, subject to waiver 
under Rule 12(h), and included among the non-merits 
grounds in Rule 41(b). 
No matter how efficient, however, “such a result 
‘must be obtained by the process of amending the 
Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.’” 
Jones, 549 U.S. at 217 (quoting Leatherman v. 
Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination 
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)). Amendments to the 
Rules require various procedural formalities, 
designed to secure important substantive interests. 
See §§ 2073–2074. Courts should not leapfrog this 
process by skipping over the statutory text and 
mislabeling forum-selection clauses as “venue.” The 
Rules treat such clauses, by default, as affirmative 
defenses; and until that changes, “federal courts and 
litigants must rely on summary judgment and control 
of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner 
rather than later.” Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168–69. 
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III. The Court Should Assume that the Clause 
Is Enforceable, Identify the Correct Proce-
dure, Vacate the Judgment, and Leave Re-
maining Issues To Be Addressed on Re-
mand. 
Atlantic Marine and J-Crew agreed that a 
dispute like this one “shall be litigated” in Norfolk, 
Va. J.A. 28. The contractual provision embodying 
that agreement was attached to and incorporated in 
J-Crew’s complaint. J.A. 7–39. If the clause is valid 
and enforceable, then the complaint on its face 
revealed a reason why the court in which it was filed 
(namely, the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Texas) should not grant relief. In other 
words, the complaint “fail[ed] to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted,” and could have been 
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).  
The facts of this case, however, raise two 
complications that the Court may wish to avoid. 
First, the case arises under state law, and there 
is much uncertainty over which body of law governs 
the enforcement of forum-selection clauses under 
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
Because the case may be decided without resolving 
that question, the Court should assume, without 
deciding, that the clause is valid and enforceable 
under the relevant body of law. 
Second, Atlantic Marine made its Rule 12(b) 
motion under the label of venue, not failure to state a 
claim. Whether that was adequate to preserve the 
issue should be left to the court of appeals to decide 
in the first instance. That court issued its judgment 
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on the erroneous assumption that § 1404 transfer 
was the only available remedy. Pet. App. 5a. The 
judgment should therefore be vacated and the case 
remanded for further proceedings. 
A. The Court should assume, without 
deciding, that the clause at issue here is 
valid and enforceable. 
Atlantic Marine assumes that the enforcement of 
a forum-selection clause in federal court (even in a 
diversity case) is governed by federal law, and in par-
ticular by the standards enunciated in The Bremen. 
See Pet. Br. 5, 13, 17. That is a controversial position, 
and the Court need not adopt it here. 
Most private contracts containing forum-
selection clauses are governed by state law. The 
Court has never decided whether the enforcement of 
a forum-selection clause on a state-law claim is 
likewise a matter of state contract law, cf. Stewart, 
487 U.S. at 38–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting)—and, if so, 
of which State, see Mullenix, Another Choice of 
Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual 
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 
Fordham L. Rev. 291, 332–39 (1988)—or whether it 
is so “essential” to the federal courts as to require a 
federal answer, cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. 
Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).15 This Erie question 
                                            
15 In Ferens v. John Deere Co., a parenthetical dictum described 
Stewart as “holding that federal law determines the validity of a 
forum selection clause.” 494 U.S. 516, 526 (1990). That dictum 
must be understood in context, namely as explaining how 
§ 1404 effectively “pre-empt[s] state law” by enabling transfers 
among federal courts that would be impossible in a state 
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needs answering regardless of the procedural device 
employed, contra Pet. Br. 18 n.6, and it has produced 
yet another split among the courts of appeals.16 The 
Court has also never expressly stated whether, if 
federal law applies, the relevant standards are those 
identified in The Bremen and Shute—which were 
both admiralty cases and which limited their 
analysis accordingly. See Shute, 499 U.S. at 590 
(“[T]his is a case in admiralty, and federal law 
governs the enforceability of the forum-selection 
clause we scrutinize.”); The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10 
(“We believe this is the correct doctrine to be followed 
by federal district courts sitting in admiralty.”). 
Here, J-Crew asserts claims solely under Texas 
                                                                                          
system. 494 U.S. at 526. Stewart deliberately sidestepped the 
Erie issue, because the case happened to arise on a § 1404 
motion, which applies a different legal standard under which 
the clause is merely one more fact to consider. See 487 U.S. at 
28–29. Even a clause that is wholly unenforceable under the 
relevant law—say, because that law requires special formalities, 
like the signatures of seven witnesses in red ink—might still be 
a “significant factor” in the § 1404 analysis if it adequately 
reflects “the parties’ private expression of their venue 
preferences,” id. at 29–30. Likewise, even a clause that is fully 
binding on the parties might not justify § 1404 transfer if the 
relevant public-interest factors counsel against it. See id. at 30–
31; Pet. Br. 25. Because § 1404 applies the same multifactor 
analysis to federal- and state-law claims, Stewart did not need 
to answer the Erie question, and so it did not. See 487 U.S. at 26 
n.3. 
16 Compare, e.g., Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 628 
F.3d 643, 650 (CA4 2010) (federal law), with IFC Credit Corp. v. 
United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 991 
(CA7 2008) (state law). 
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law. J.A. 9–14. Unlike in Stewart, there is no federal 
statute or rule to apply. Fortunately, however, the 
Court need not “wade into Erie’s murky waters” yet. 
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437. The district court 
found the forum-selection clause to be consistent with 
Texas contract law, see Pet. App. 31a, and J-Crew 
chose not to contest that determination in the court 
of appeals, see Response to Petition for Writ of 
Mandamus in No. 12-50826 (CA5), pp. 10–13, or in 
its brief in opposition. (J-Crew claimed that Texas 
has “a strong interest in having local construction 
disputes decided [there],” and cited the state statute 
the district court found inapplicable, but it declined 
to argue that Texas law actually forbids enforcement. 
BIO 4 n.2 (citing Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 272.001). 
Nor did J-Crew argue that the clause was invalid or 
unenforceable under federal standards. See BIO 10–
11. Under this Court’s Rule 15.2, J-Crew has 
forfeited any argument that the clause is 
unenforceable. 
For the purposes of this case, then, the Court 
may assume that the clause is valid and enforceable, 
whether or not federal courts should generally apply 
The Bremen’s standards to state-law claims—or even 
to federal claims outside admiralty. 
B. The Court should leave all preservation 
issues for the court of appeals in the 
first instance. 
As noted above, Atlantic Marine framed its 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) rather than 
12(b)(6). J-Crew accordingly argues that a 12(b)(6) 
theory—and, presumably, the affirmative-defense 
procedure more generally—is “not properly before the 
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Court on the merits.” BIO 2 n.1; see id. at 12–13 & 
n.6. Because the label of the motion does not always 
control, these preservation issues should be left for 
the court of appeals to decide in the first instance. 
Atlantic Marine’s Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss 
argued that J-Crew’s suit violates a valid and 
enforceable forum-selection clause. J.A. 48–50. The 
substance of those arguments would be the same 
regardless of which 12(b) label they bore. When 
enforcing forum-selection clauses in motions to 
dismiss, appellate courts are not always “bound by 
the label employed below”—especially given the 
confused state of the law. Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 
1110, 1112 n.1 (CA1 1993). The court of appeals had 
previously held that, “[a]s a general matter, the 
caption on a pleading does not constrain the court’s 
treatment of a pleading,” and it has applied this 
principle to construe motions without regard to their 
captions. N. Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. City of San 
Juan, 90 F.3d 910, 918 (CA5 1996) (per curiam) (Rule 
59(e) motion).17 It could equally have chosen to do so 
here. 
The court of appeals did not consider this 
possibility, in part because it “agree[d]” with the 
district court that “when a forum-selection clause 
designates a specific federal forum * * * , a motion to 
transfer under § 1404(a) is the proper procedural 
                                            
17 Cf. 5C Wright & Miller § 1378, at 380 (“In accordance with 
the basic philosophy of the federal rules, the general attitude of 
the courts has been that a Rule 12(e) motion need not be filed 
under a technically correct label for it to be considered as one by 
the court.”). 
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mechanism for enforcing the clause.” Pet. App. 5a. 
But if Atlantic Marine would be entitled to dismissal, 
this Court may vacate a judgment founded on an 
“erroneous view to the contrary.” United States v. 
Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2330–31 
(2011). The court of appeals may then decide, on a 
correct view of the law, whether to look past the 
caption and engage the substance of Atlantic 
Marine’s original motion. As this is a Court of 
“review, not of first view,” FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 529 (2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), it is enough for this Court 
to identify the proper procedure, vacate the 
judgment, and remand the case to the court of 
appeals.18 
Atlantic Marine has not relied on the 
affirmative-defense procedure in its brief to this 
Court. See Pet. Br. 17–18. Yet the Court may still 
frame the legal issues properly, whether or not that 
framing is urged by the parties. “When an issue or 
claim is properly before the court, the court is not 
limited to the particular legal theories advanced by 
the parties, but rather retains the independent power 
to identify and apply the proper construction of 
governing law.” Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 
500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991). And when an argument falls 
squarely within the Question Presented and is hardly 
                                            
18 That court may also consider, e.g., whether this relabeling is 
appropriate on a petition for mandamus, see Cheney v. U.S. 
Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004), or whether any error in 
the district court could be adequately remedied on appeal, see 
Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 501. 
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“foreign to the parties,” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 
300 (1989) (plurality opinion), it is no barrier that the 
argument is presented only by an amicus curiae. See 
id.; see also, e.g., Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 
299, 309–10 (1999). 
If possible, the Court should correctly resolve the 
multidirectional circuit split that necessitated the 
grant of certiorari. If the Court is reluctant to discuss 
the affirmative-defense procedure, amicus 
respectfully urges that the Court make that 
reluctance explicit. An opinion that does no more 
than find Rule 12(b)(3) or § 1406 motions 
inappropriate, without explicitly clarifying what 
other procedures might still be available, will at best 
leave portions of the many-sided split in place. At 
worst, it may be misunderstood as endorsing 
§ 1404—or a separate suit for damages—as the only 
available means of relief.19  
                                            
19 Because Atlantic Marine requested dismissal, not just trans-
fer, the Court should reach these issues regardless of how it 
resolves the second Question Presented. No matter how 
favorable the burden of proof, limiting the remedy to § 1404 
effectively rewards a plaintiff’s breach of contract. Pet. Br. 20. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the court of appeals should be 
vacated and the case remanded for further proceed-
ings.  
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28 U.S.C. § 1390 
Scope 
(a) VENUE DEFINED.—As used in this chapter, 
the term ‘‘venue’’ refers to the geographic 
specification of the proper court or courts for the 
litigation of a civil action that is within the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the district courts in general, 
and does not refer to any grant or restriction of 
subject-matter jurisdiction providing for a civil action 
to be adjudicated only by the district court for a 
particular district or districts. 
(b) EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN CASES.—Except as 
otherwise provided by law, this chapter shall not 
govern the venue of a civil action in which the district 
court exercises the jurisdiction conferred by section 
1333, except that such civil actions may be 
transferred between district courts as provided in 
this chapter. 
(c) CLARIFICATION REGARDING CASES REMOVED 
FROM STATE COURTS.—This chapter shall not 
determine the district court to which a civil action 
pending in a State court may be removed, but shall 
govern the transfer of an action so removed as 
between districts and divisions of the United States 
district courts. 
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28 U.S.C § 1391  
Venue generally 
(a) APPLICABILITY OF SECTION.—Except as 
otherwise provided by law— 
(1) this section shall govern the venue of all 
civil actions brought in district courts of the 
United States; and 
(2) the proper venue for a civil action shall 
be determined without regard to whether the 
action is local or transitory in nature. 
(b) VENUE IN GENERAL.—A civil action may be 
brought in— 
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant 
resides, if all defendants are residents of the 
State in which the district is located; 
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial 
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the 
claim occurred, or a substantial part of property 
that is the subject of the action is situated; or 
(3) if there is no district in which an action 
may otherwise be brought as provided in this 
section, any judicial district in which any 
defendant is subject to the court’s personal 
jurisdiction with respect to such action. 
(c) RESIDENCY.—For all venue purposes— 
(1) a natural person, including an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the 
United States, shall be deemed to reside in the 
judicial district in which that person is 
domiciled; 
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(2) an entity with the capacity to sue and be 
sued in its common name under applicable law, 
whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to 
reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in 
which such defendant is subject to the court’s 
personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil 
action in question and, if a plaintiff, only in the 
judicial district in which it maintains its 
principal place of business; and 
(3) a defendant not resident in the United 
States may be sued in any judicial district, and 
the joinder of such a defendant shall be 
disregarded in determining where the action 
may be brought with respect to other defendants. 
(d) RESIDENCY OF CORPORATIONS IN STATES WITH 
MULTIPLE DISTRICTS.—For purposes of venue under 
this chapter, in a State which has more than one 
judicial district and in which a defendant that is a 
corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the 
time an action is commenced, such corporation shall 
be deemed to reside in any district in that State 
within which its contacts would be sufficient to 
subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were 
a separate State, and, if there is no such district, the 
corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district 
within which it has the most significant contacts. 
(e) ACTIONS WHERE DEFENDANT IS OFFICER OR 
EMPLOYEE OF THE UNITED STATES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—A civil action in which a 
defendant is an officer or employee of the United 
States or any agency thereof acting in his official 
capacity or under color of legal authority, or an 
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agency of the United States, or the United 
States, may, except as otherwise provided by 
law, be brought in any judicial district in which 
(A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a 
substantial part of the events or omissions giving 
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part 
of property that is the subject of the action is 
situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real 
property is involved in the action. Additional 
persons may be joined as parties to any such 
action in accordance with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and with such other venue 
requirements as would be applicable if the 
United States or one of its officers, employees, or 
agencies were not a party. 
(2) SERVICE.—The summons and complaint 
in such an action shall be served as provided by 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that 
the delivery of the summons and complaint to 
the officer or agency as required by the rules 
may be made by certified mail beyond the 
territorial limits of the district in which the 
action is brought. 
(f) CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST A FOREIGN STATE.—A 
civil action against a foreign state as defined in 
section 1603(a) of this title may be brought— 
(1) in any judicial district in which a 
substantial part of the events or omissions giving 
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part 
of property that is the subject of the action is 
situated; 
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(2) in any judicial district in which the vessel 
or cargo of a foreign state is situated, if the claim 
is asserted under section 1605(b) of this title; 
(3) in any judicial district in which the 
agency or instrumentality is licensed to do 
business or is doing business, if the action is 
brought against an agency or instrumentality of 
a foreign state as defined in section 1603(b) of 
this title; or 
(4) in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia if the action is brought 
against a foreign state or political subdivision 
thereof. 
(g) MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM LITIGATION.—A 
civil action in which jurisdiction of the district court 
is based upon section 1369 of this title may be 
brought in any district in which any defendant 
resides or in which a substantial part of the accident 
giving rise to the action took place. 
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28 U.S.C. § 1406 
Cure or waiver of defects 
(a) The district court of a district in which is filed 
a case laying venue in the wrong division or district 
shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, 
transfer such case to any district or division in which 
it could have been brought. 
(b) Nothing in this chapter shall impair the 
jurisdiction of a district court of any matter involving 
a party who does not interpose timely and sufficient 
objection to the venue.  
(c) As used in this section, the term ‘‘district 
court’’ includes the District Court of Guam, the 
District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, and 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the term 
‘‘district’’ includes the territorial jurisdiction of each 
such court. 
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 
General Rules of Pleading 
(a) CLAIM FOR RELIEF. A pleading that states a 
claim for relief must contain: 
(1) a short and plain statement of the 
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the 
court already has jurisdiction and the claim 
needs no new jurisdictional support; 
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and 
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which 
may include relief in the alternative or different 
types of relief. 
(b) DEFENSES; ADMISSIONS AND DENIALS. 
(1) In General. In responding to a pleading, a 
party must: 
(A) state in short and plain terms its 
defenses to each claim asserted against it; 
and 
(B) admit or deny the allegations 
asserted against it by an opposing party. 
(2) Denials—Responding to the Substance. A 
denial must fairly respond to the substance of 
the allegation. 
(3) General and Specific Denials. A party 
that intends in good faith to deny all the 
allegations of a pleading—including the 
jurisdictional grounds—may do so by a general 
denial. A party that does not intend to deny all 
8a 
the allegations must either specifically deny 
designated allegations or generally deny all 
except those specifically admitted. 
(4) Denying Part of an Allegation. A party 
that intends in good faith to deny only part of an 
allegation must admit the part that is true and 
deny the rest. 
(5) Lacking Knowledge or Information. A 
party that lacks knowledge or information 
sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an 
allegation must so state, and the statement has 
the effect of a denial. 
(6) Effect of Failing to Deny. An allegation—
other than one relating to the amount of 
damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is 
required and the allegation is not denied. If a 
responsive pleading is not required, an allegation 
is considered denied or avoided. 
(c) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES. 
(1) In General. In responding to a pleading, a 
party must affirmatively state any avoidance or 
affirmative defense, including: 
• accord and satisfaction; 
• arbitration and award; 
• assumption of risk; 
• contributory negligence; 
• duress; 
• estoppel; 
• failure of consideration; 
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• fraud; 
• illegality; 
• injury by fellow servant; 
• laches; 
• license; 
• payment; 
• release; 
• res judicata; 
• statute of frauds; 
• statute of limitations; and 
• waiver. 
(2) Mistaken Designation. If a party 
mistakenly designates a defense as a 
counterclaim, or a counterclaim as a defense, the 
court must, if justice requires, treat the pleading 
as though it were correctly designated, and may 
impose terms for doing so. 
(d) PLEADING TO BE CONCISE AND DIRECT; 
ALTERNATIVE STATEMENTS; INCONSISTENCY. 
(1) In General. Each allegation must be 
simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is 
required. 
(2) Alternative Statements of a Claim or 
Defense. A party may set out 2 or more 
statements of a claim or defense alternatively or 
hypothetically, either in a single count or defense 
or in separate ones. If a party makes alternative 
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statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one 
of them is sufficient. 
(3) Inconsistent Claims or Defenses. A party 
may state as many separate claims or defenses 
as it has, regardless of consistency. 
(e) CONSTRUING PLEADINGS. Pleadings must be 
construed so as to do justice. 
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 
Defenses and Objections: When and How 
Presented; Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings; Consolidating Motions; Waiving 
Defenses; Pretrial Hearing 
(a) TIME TO SERVE A RESPONSIVE PLEADING. 
(1) In General. Unless another time is 
specified by this rule or a federal statute, the 
time for serving a responsive pleading is as 
follows: 
(A) A defendant must serve an answer: 
(i) within 21 days after being served 
with the summons and complaint; or 
(ii) if it has timely waived service 
under Rule 4(d), within 60 days after the 
request for a waiver was sent, or within 
90 days after it was sent to the defendant 
outside any judicial district of the United 
States. 
(B) A party must serve an answer to a 
counterclaim or crossclaim within 21 days 
after being served with the pleading that 
states the counterclaim or crossclaim. 
(C) A party must serve a reply to an 
answer within 21 days after being served 
with an order to reply, unless the order 
specifies a different time. 
(2) United States and Its Agencies, Officers, 
or Employees Sued in an Official Capacity. The 
United States, a United States agency, or a 
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United States officer or employee sued only in an 
official capacity must serve an answer to a 
complaint, counterclaim, or crossclaim within 60 
days after service on the United States attorney. 
(3) United States Officers or Employees Sued 
in an Individual Capacity. A United States 
officer or employee sued in an individual capacity 
for an act or omission occurring in connection 
with duties performed on the United States’ 
behalf must serve an answer to a complaint, 
counterclaim, or crossclaim within 60 days after 
service on the officer or employee or service on 
the United States attorney, whichever is later. 
(4) Effect of a Motion. Unless the court sets a 
different time, serving a motion under this rule 
alters these periods as follows: 
(A) if the court denies the motion or 
postpones its disposition until trial, the 
responsive pleading must be served within 
14 days after notice of the court’s action; or 
(B) if the court grants a motion for a 
more definite statement, the responsive 
pleading must be served within 14 days after 
the more definite statement is served. 
(b) HOW TO PRESENT DEFENSES. Every defense to 
a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in 
the responsive pleading if one is required. But a 
party may assert the following defenses by motion: 
(1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; 
(2) lack of personal jurisdiction; 
(3) improper venue; 
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(4) insufficient process; 
(5) insufficient service of process; 
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted; and 
(7) failure to join a party under Rule 19. 
A motion asserting any of these defenses must be 
made before pleading if a responsive pleading is 
allowed. If a pleading sets out a claim for relief that 
does not require a responsive pleading, an opposing 
party may assert at trial any defense to that claim. 
No defense or objection is waived by joining it with 
one or more other defenses or objections in a 
responsive pleading or in a motion. 
(c) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. 
After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not 
to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the 
pleadings. 
(d) RESULT OF PRESENTING MATTERS OUTSIDE THE 
PLEADINGS. If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 
12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to 
and not excluded by the court, the motion must be 
treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. 
All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to 
present all the material that is pertinent to the 
motion. 
(e) MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT. A 
party may move for a more definite statement of a 
pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed 
but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party 
cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion 
must be made before filing a responsive pleading and 
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must point out the defects complained of and the 
details desired. If the court orders a more definite 
statement and the order is not obeyed within 14 days 
after notice of the order or within the time the court 
sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any 
other appropriate order. 
(f) MOTION TO STRIKE. The court may strike from 
a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, 
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The 
court may act: 
(1) on its own; or 
(2) on motion made by a party either before 
responding to the pleading or, if a response is not 
allowed, within 21 days after being served with 
the pleading. 
(g) JOINING MOTIONS. 
(1) Right to Join. A motion under this rule 
may be joined with any other motion allowed by 
this rule. 
(2) Limitation on Further Motions. Except as 
provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that 
makes a motion under this rule must not make 
another motion under this rule raising a defense 
or objection that was available to the party but 
omitted from its earlier motion. 
(h) WAIVING AND PRESERVING CERTAIN DEFENSES. 
(1) When Some Are Waived. A party waives 
any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)–(5) by: 
(A) omitting it from a motion in the 
circumstances described in Rule 12(g)(2); or 
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(B) failing to either: 
(i) make it by motion under this 
rule; or 
(ii) include it in a responsive 
pleading or in an amendment allowed by 
Rule 15(a)(1) as a matter of course. 
(2) When to Raise Others. Failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, to join a 
person required by Rule 19(b), or to state a legal 
defense to a claim may be raised: 
(A) in any pleading allowed or ordered 
under Rule 7(a); 
(B) by a motion under Rule 12(c); or 
(C) at trial. 
(3) Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction. If 
the court determines at any time that it lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must 
dismiss the action. 
(i) HEARING BEFORE TRIAL. If a party so moves, 
any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(1)–(7)—whether 
made in a pleading or by motion—and a motion 
under Rule 12(c) must be heard and decided before 
trial unless the court orders a deferral until trial. 
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 
Summary Judgment 
(a) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. A party may move for 
summary judgment, identifying each claim or 
defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on 
which summary judgment is sought. The court shall 
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. The court should state on the record the reasons 
for granting or denying the motion. 
(b) TIME TO FILE A MOTION. Unless a different 
time is set by local rule or the court orders otherwise, 
a party may file a motion for summary judgment at 
any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery. 
(c) PROCEDURES. 
(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party 
asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely 
disputed must support the assertion by: 
(A) citing to particular parts of materials 
in the record, including depositions, 
documents, electronically stored information, 
affidavits or declarations, stipulations 
(including those made for purposes of the 
motion only), admissions, interrogatory 
answers, or other materials; or 
(B) showing that the materials cited do 
not establish the absence or presence of a 
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party 
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cannot produce admissible evidence to 
support the fact. 
(2) Objection That a Fact Is Not Supported 
by Admissible Evidence. A party may object that 
the material cited to support or dispute a fact 
cannot be presented in a form that would be 
admissible in evidence. 
(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need 
consider only the cited materials, but it may 
consider other materials in the record. 
(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or 
declaration used to support or oppose a motion 
must be made on personal knowledge, set out 
facts that would be admissible in evidence, and 
show that the affiant or declarant is competent 
to testify on the matters stated. 
(d) WHEN FACTS ARE UNAVAILABLE TO THE 
NONMOVANT. If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or 
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot 
present facts essential to justify its opposition, the 
court may: 
(1) defer considering the motion or deny it; 
(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or 
declarations or to take discovery; or 
(3) issue any other appropriate order. 
(e) FAILING TO PROPERLY SUPPORT OR ADDRESS A 
FACT. If a party fails to properly support an assertion 
of fact or fails to properly address another party’s 
assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court 
may: 
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(1) give an opportunity to properly support 
or address the fact; 
(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes 
of the motion; 
(3) grant summary judgment if the motion 
and supporting materials—including the facts 
considered undisputed—show that the movant is 
entitled to it; or 
(4) issue any other appropriate order. 
(f) JUDGMENT INDEPENDENT OF THE MOTION. 
After giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, 
the court may: 
(1) grant summary judgment for a 
nonmovant; 
(2) grant the motion on grounds not raised 
by a party; or 
(3) consider summary judgment on its own 
after identifying for the parties material facts 
that may not be genuinely in dispute. 
(g) FAILING TO GRANT ALL THE REQUESTED 
RELIEF. If the court does not grant all the relief 
requested by the motion, it may enter an order 
stating any material fact—including an item of 
damages or other relief—that is not genuinely in 
dispute and treating the fact as established in the 
case. 
(h) AFFIDAVIT OR DECLARATION SUBMITTED IN 
BAD FAITH. If satisfied that an affidavit or 
declaration under this rule is submitted in bad faith 
or solely for delay, the court—after notice and a 
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reasonable time to respond—may order the 
submitting party to pay the other party the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, it 
incurred as a result. An offending party or attorney 
may also be held in contempt or subjected to other 
appropriate sanctions. 
